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I. INTRODUCTION
As businesses become increasingly globalized, it is only natural that
international commercial transactions and contractual obligations follow.
While parties entering into such transactions may not always be aware of
applicable foreign laws, they still desire freedom, predictability, and
convenience in contracting. The need for a uniform set of laws is
especially significant in the area of international contracts because
ascertaining the applicable law is more difficult in this area than in
almost any other area of law.' International contracts are complicated by
several issues: 1) numerous connecting factors, 2) various contractual
issues, and 3) the many different types of contracts that exist.2 First, the
diversity of connecting factors raised by the unique facts of a case,
including the place of performance, the place where the contract is
made, the parties' domicile, nationality, or place of business, and the
1. See P.M. NORTH & J.J. FAWCETr, CHESHIRE AND NORTH'S PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 457 (12th ed. 1992).
2. See id. at 457-58.
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location of the subject matter complicate international contracts.
Specifically, the presence of these connecting factors makes it difficult
for any party or court to identify a single factor that determines the
applicable law.4 Second, there is a question as to which law should
determine, among other things, the interpretation, validity, and discharge
of the contractual obligation And third, due to the number of different
types of contracts that exist, including contracts for the sale of goods,
employment contracts, and insurance contracts, an issue arises as to
whether different types of contracts should be governed by a uniform
law or if different laws should govern each particular type of contract.6
Both contracting parties and courts must consider these issues in
creating, interpreting, and enforcing international contracts.
Parties and courts face a dilemma in trying to determine which laws
apply to their international contracts. This dilemma could be solved
either by: 1) standardizing contractual provisions for all international
contracts, or 2) by giving parties the ability to choose their own laws to
govern their contractual obligations. Both situations provide parties
with familiarity and predictability with the rules governing such
transactions. While one standard set of rules that would govern all
international contracts is a novel idea, complications prevent such a
standard set of rules from becoming a reality. It is unlikely that
standardization of international contract rules will ever exist based on
history, precedent, alliances between countries, national views, and
different political systems. Additionally, standardization of international
contract rules might sacrifice the flexibility and autonomy contracting
parties desire.
For these reasons, international conventions provide rules that allow
contracting parties to choose laws to govern their contracts. One such
convention is the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to
Contractual Obligations (hereinafter the "Rome Convention") . The
3. See id. In most types of legal disputes, there is usually a decisive connecting
factor from which it is reasonably clear to ascertain the applicable law. But with contract
disputes, because of the sheer multiplicity of connecting factors present, it is difficult to
identify a single connecting factor as determinant of the applicable law. See id.
4. See id.
5. " See id. at 457-58 (noting that an additional consideration that further complicates this
choice of law determination is whether or not contracting parties have considered what
law should govern their contract in case a dispute arises).
6. See id.
7. Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 1980
O.J. (L 266) 1, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 1492 (1980) [hereinafter Rome Convention].
Rome Convention is the governing body of law for international
contractual obligations in the European Economic Community.8 The
Rome Convention aims to unify rules on applicable law within the
European Community and acts as a central component of European
conflicts law designed to further legal protection and equalization of
contracts rights within the Community.9 This Comment explores the
provisions of the Rome Convention and the advantages contracting
parties can benefit from through knowledge of such provisions.
The main focus of this Comment is English conflict of laws rules
related to contractual obligations that are governed by the Rome
Convention. England and its laws on international contracts have been
chosen as the appropriate subject of this Comment for the following
reasons. First, because international conventions and treaties do not
apply to all countries but only to those who ratify them, it is easier to see
how the rules of such conventions are applied by a particular ratifying
country rather than by discussing the rules in abstract terms. England, as
a part of the United Kingdom, is a signatory to the Rome Convention.' °
Thus, English courts' application of the Rome Convention's rules is a
representative source from which to examine the operation of
international contract rules. Second, England is a popular choice for
international contracting because of London's reputation as a leading
world business player. And third, England acts as an excellent legal
comparison to the United States because of the close connection between
English common law and United States common law.
This Comment consists of six parts. Part I introduces the complexities
surrounding international contractual obligations and the conflict of laws
rules provided by the Rome Convention to resolve such complexities.
Part II describes the system of private international law for international
contracts and the specific sources of English conflict of laws rules as
they relate to contracts, with a focus on the Rome Convention. Part III
explores English common law and conflict of laws rules related to
international contracts in existence prior to the Rome Convention. Part
IV examines relevant provisions of the Rome Convention in detail. The
need for parties to include express choice of law clauses in their
8. See id.
9. See PETER KAYE, THE NEW PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CONTRACT OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ix-x (1993). The intent of the Rome Convention is to unify
conflict of laws rules within the European Community in the absence of "substantive
harmonization of differing contract laws." Id. at ix.
10. See Rome Convention, supra note 7, at 8-10; Recent Actions Regarding
Treaties to Which the United States Is Not a Party, Jan., 1992, 31 I.L.M. 245 [hereinafter
Recent Actions] (noting that other countries that ratified the Rome Convention include
France, Italy, Denmark, Luxembourg, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Ireland;
the United States has not ratified the Rome Convention).
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contracts is illustrated first by describing the complexity and uncertainty
that result from applying the default rules in the absence of an express
choice of law. These results are then contrasted with the clearer, more
predictable results that follow from applying rules for contracts that
contain choice of law clauses. Part V considers and compares United
States conflict of laws with corresponding provisions in the Rome
Convention for contracts containing choice of law clauses." This
comparison illustrates why choice of law provisions are more likely to
be upheld by courts under the Rome Convention than under similar
United States laws. Part VI concludes that parties contracting under the
Rome Convention should not rely on courts to determine their contracts'
applicable law. Instead, parties should control the governance of their
contracts by taking advantage of the Rome Convention's flexibility and
predictability by including choice of law provisions in their contracts.
II. OVERVIEW: ENGLISH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND CONTRACTS
Once an English court determines that it has jurisdiction over both the
parties and the cause of action in a contract dispute containing a foreign
element,'2 the court must determine the law that governs the dispute.'3
"Private international law," also known as international "conflict of
laws," is the body of jurisprudence that determines which law governs
cases that contain foreign elements." While there is no single governing
11. See also Mathias Reimann, Savigny's Triumph? Choice of Law in Contracts
Cases at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 571 (1999) (comparing
American and European rules on conflicts of law and choice of law for contracts).
12. A foreign element may appear in many forms. See NORTH & FAWCETT, supra
note 1, at 5 (noting that a foreign element appears in a case where: 1) a party is foreign
by domicile or nationality; 2) an action concerns property situated abroad; 3) a
disposition is made outside of England for property located in England; 4) a contract is
made in one country but is to be performed in another country; or 5) parties use the
courts of a foreign country to resolve their disputes).
13. See id. at 8, 43. Note that this Comment will not directly address jurisdictional
issues as they are mainly procedural and, as such, are not governed by the Rome
Convention. See Rome Convention, supra note 7, at article l(2)(h), which states that the
rules of the Rome Convention "shall not apply to evidence and procedure." id. This
Comment concerns the function of courts once jurisdiction has been established in a
State which is a member of the Rome Convention. See also NORTH & FAWCETT, supra
note 1, at 43, 179-279, for a detailed discussion relating to obtaining jurisdiction in
English courts.
14. See NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 1, at 3. 8. See also BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 822, 1214 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "private international law" as
body or domain of private international law within England or other
European countries, there are separate legal municipal systems that
combine to form private international law."5  English private
international law "comes into operation whenever the court is faced with
a claim that contains a foreign element," or contact with some system of
law other than English law.'6 English private international law provides
choice of law rules to determine the most appropriate legal system to
govern the international issue at hand.'7
The function of private international law is to determine the
appropriate system of law that governs an international dispute.'"
Therefore, private international law does not provide a direct or final
answer to the dispute.' 9 For example, an English court adjudicates a
dispute over a contract drafted in the United States and one party sues
for breach of contract. If the opposing party, in its defense, contends
that the contract is invalid under the United States Statute of Frauds
laws, private international law will determine which country's laws the
English court should apply in deciding the case. Private international
law will not provide the English court with the actual substantive law.
In this example, private international law dictates that United States law
should determine the enforceability of the contract but private
international law does not tell the English court the details of the
relevant United States law. The English court will look to experts to
prove the relevant United States law.
The sources of English private international law include statutes
"[i]nternational conflict of laws... the mode in which rules of private law are borrowed
by the Courts of one State from those of another"). According to A.W. Scott, both
"private international law" and "conflict of laws" are generally accepted titles for this
subject of law. A.W. SCOTT, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (CONFLICT OF LAWS) 4
(1972). The title "private international law" could be misleading though because it
might suggest that an international aspect is involved, which is not necessarily true. See
id. In fact, "private international law" is a branch of national (English) law, similar to
the law of contract, but, "unlike the law of contract, its sphere of influence includes all
other branches of the law except perhaps criminal law" as its function is to determine the
appropriate system of substantive law to govern in a particular case with a foreign
element. Id. at 3, 8. Thus, there may be no international aspect involved and "private
international law" may still be invoked, as in the case of an action arising between two
English parties relating to property situated outside of England. See id. at 4; NORTH &
FAWCETT, supra note I, at 5.
15. See NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 1, at 3. The rules which regulate legal
relations occurring in daily life differ greatly within each separate municipal system of
law. For this reason, courts in one country frequently have to take account of a rule of
law that exists in another country. See id.
16. Id. at 3-5.
17. See id.
18. See id at 8 (comparing private international law to the information desk at a
railway station where a passenger is able to learn from which platform his train starts).
19. See id.
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(which implement rules of international conventions), court decisions,
and opinions of jurists. 20 While case law continues to make significant
contributions to private international law, statutes have become "the
most important source [of private international law] and their importance
seems likely to increase.",2' For these reasons, this Comment explores
statutory implementation of international conventions and related case
law pertaining to rules governing choice of law conflicts in international
English contracts.
Contract law is an important area in private international law because
parties are often from different countries. Thus, contracting parties must
look to rules governing international transactions for applicable
guidance. The Contracts (Applicable Law) Act of 19902 (hereinafter the
"Contracts Act") is the statute currently in force in England that
incorporates the rules of, and gives effect to, the Rome Convention.23
The Rome Convention was implemented by English Parliament
primarily to: 1) harmonize and improve the certainty of law governing
international contracts,2 and 2) unify the rules of conflict within the
European Community." The Rome Convention establishes standards of
private international law as they relate to contractual obligations
between ratifying members of the European Community and other
international contracting parties. Various European countries, including
the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Denmark, Luxembourg, Germany,
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Ireland have ratified the Rome
Convention. 6
As this Comment shows, the Rome Convention allows parties the
flexibility to express their own choice of laws to govern their contracts
20. See I A.V. DICEY & J.H.C. MORRIS, DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS 7-8 (Lawrence Collins et al. eds., 12th ed. 1993).
21. 1 id.
22. Contracts (Applicable Law) Act, 1990, ch. 36 (Eng.) (containing provisions for
the laws applicable to contractual obligations in the case of conflicts of laws).
23. See id. § 2(1). Section 2(1) of the Contracts Act gives the force of law to the
Rome Convention in the United Kingdom. See id. See also KAYE, supra note 9, at 1.
24. See NORTH & FAWCETr, supra note 1, at 460. Whether or not the Rome
Convention actually satisfies these goals is a matter of controversy between enthusiasts
and critics.
25. See H. Matthew Horlacher, Note, The Rome Convention and the German
Paradigm: Forecasting the Demise of the European Convention on the Law Applicable
to Contractual Obligations, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 173, 174 (1994).
26. See Rome Convention, supra note 7, at 8-10; Recent Actions, supra note 10
(noting that the Rome Convention is open to signatures by Members of the European
Community). See also NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 1, at 460.
and contains fewer limitations on parties' choice of laws than
comparable United States rules. This encourages parties to contract
internationally and ensures that their contracts are carried out in
accordance with their intent. Because the Rome Convention provides
flexibility in contracting, parties who are aware of its provisions can gain
advantages by choosing the laws to govern their contracts. In doing so,
parties avoid relying on courts to perform the cumbersome and
confusing task of implying governing laws into their contracts.
III. PRE CONTRACTS ACT AND PRE ROME CONVENTION:
ENGLISH COMMON LAW AND CONFLICT OF
LAWS RULES FOR INTERNATIONAL
CONTRACTS
English common law provided a basis for conflict of laws rules before
England codified international contract law through the Contracts Act
(and gave effect to such rules through the Rome Convention)." English
common law was notably similar to the rules in force today. English
common law allowed parties to choose the law governing the contract.
This choice determined the "proper law of the contract" as long as the
application of a foreign law was not contrary to public policy28 and the
expressed intention was "bona fide and legal."29 The "proper law of the
contract" was the law that governed "relations subsisting under the
contract as a whole, subject to the possibility of its optional
displacement by a different law or laws in respect of certain aspects of
the contract.. . and to its non-application in favor of other connecting
factors. ... ,30 Absent an express choice of law, English common law
27. See NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 1, at 458. Prior to the Contracts Act,
English law applied the "proper law of the contract," where parties could chose the laws
to govern their contracts. If the parties did not express a choice of law, one would be
inferred by the courts. If this was not possible, an objective test would be applied. See
id.
28. See 2 A.V. DICEY & J.H.C. MORRIS, DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS 1189 (Lawrence Collins et al. eds., 12th ed. 1993). See also KAYE, supra note 9,
at 19-20 (listing examples of contracts against public policy, including Foster v.
Driscoll, I K.B. 470 (1929), where the contract was to be governed by English law and
the subject of the contract was the smuggling of liquor into the United States in
contravention of United States prohibition laws and de Wutz v. Hendricks, 2 Bing. 314
(1824), which involved an English contract to finance a rebellion abroad).
29. Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., I App. Cas. 277, 290 (P.C.
1939) (holding that absent a choice of law, express words to a contract must receive
effect and, by English law, the "proper law of the contract" is the law which the parties
intended to apply).
30. KAYE, supra note 9, at 9. The proper law could be displaced by a different law
with respect to aspects of the contract such as capacity and form and may not be applied
at all due to other connecting factors such as mode of performance or money of account.
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courts tried to imply a law into the contract based on the terms and
nature of the contract and on the general circumstances of the case.3 If
the court was unable to infer a governing law from the nature and
circumstances of the contract, the contract was governed by the "system
of law with which the transaction had its closest and most real
connection. 32
The basic tenet of the proper law of the contract doctrine allowed
parties to choose the law governing their contracts. If no law was
chosen, the proper law directed the court to imply into the contract a law
that was somehow connected to the contract. While these principles
have been incorporated into the Rome Convention, there are some
technical differences between English common law (the proper law of
the contract) and the Rome Convention that have important implications.
There are two significant differences between the proper law of the
contract and the Rome Convention that reinforce the idea that parties
should use the Rome Convention provisions to choose a law to govern
their contracts. First, parties have greater autonomy under the Rome
Convention because they can alter the law applicable to the contract
after the contract is in force.33 It was uncertain whether parties could
alter the proper law after the contract was in force under pre-Rome
Convention English common law. 34 Second, while it is a difficult task
for a court to imply a governing law into a contract when no law is
specified, the provisions under the Rome Convention that courts must
follow to complete such a task are more complicated and uncertain than
those previously in force under English proper law.35 This fact stresses
See id.
31. See 2 DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 28, at 1189. See, e.g., James Miller &
Partners, Ltd. v. Whitworth St. Estates (Manchester) Ltd., 1 App. Cas. 583 (H.L. 1970)
(holding that English law was the proper law to govern a particular contract despite the
court's use of Scottish procedural law; English law governed because the contract had
obvious connections with English law and the proper inference from the conduct of the
parties was that they adopted English law as the proper law of the contract).
32. James Miller, 1 App. Cas. at 611. Irrespective of the parties' intentions, the
court considered surrounding circumstances to determine with which system of law the
transaction was most closely connected. See id.
33. See Rome Convention, supra note 7, art. 3(2). See also KAYE, supra note 9, at
442.
34. See Rome Convention, supra note 7, art. 3(2). See also KAYE, supra note 9, at
442.
35. Note that English common law would imply a law into the contract based on
the terms of the contract, general circumstances of the case, or the system with which the
transaction had its closest and most real connection. See 2 DICEY & MORRIS, supra note
28, at 1189. The Rome Convention continues to apply the same terms of the proper law
the importance for parties to express a choice of law in their contracts so
that they do not have to leave the courts with such a complicated, and
possibly uncertain, determination.
The current conflict of laws rules in force in England, as established
by the Rome Convention, provide similar freedom for contracting
parties to express their choice of laws and, in the absence of such choice,
specify that the law of the country most closely connected to the
transaction will govern.36  England was able to codify the choices it
historically gave to contracting parties as well as provide various other
contract provisions that can be uniformly applied in international
English contracts by ratifying the Rome Convention and giving it effect
through the Contracts Act.
IV. THE ROME CONVENTION
A. General
England, as part of the United Kingdom, ratified the Rome
Convention on January 29, 1991, and gave it effect on April 1, 1991, the
date the Contracts Act entered into force.37 The Rome Convention
applies to all contractual obligations concluded thereafter that are tried in
a Contracting States' court.38 The Rome Convention's central purpose is
to unify and codify the conflict of laws rules in the European Economic
Community.39 The Rome Convention's four main pillars of law are:
test but also forces courts to consider rebuttable presumptions in conjunction with the
basic tests. See KAYE, supra note 9, at 442; infra Part IV.E.1. ("The Characteristic
Performance/Closest Connection Test (The Rome Convention, Article 4(2)
Presumption)"); infra Part IV.E.2.a. and b. ("Non-Application and Rebuttal of the Rome
Convention, Article 4(2) Presumption (as Determined by the Rome Convention, Article
4(5))"); infra Part IV.F.2.c. ("Mandatory Rules").
36. See Rome Convention, supra note 7, arts. 3, 4.
37. See Contracts (Applicable Law) Act, 1990, § I (Eng.); Recent Actions, supra
note 10. See also NORTH & FAWCETr, supra note 1, at 459 (noting that the United
Kingdom provided the requisite seventh ratification for the Rome Convention and it
actually came into force in the United Kingdom on April 1, 1991); RICHARD PLENDER,
THE EUROPEAN CONTRACTS CONVENTION, THE ROME CONVENTION ON THE CHOICE OF
LAW FOR CONTRACTS 22, 25 (1991) (noting that ratification of the Rome Convention by
the United Kingdom occurred on January 29, 1991; the Rome Convention was given
effect when the Contracts Act came into force on April 1, 1991).
38. See Rome Convention, supra note 7, art. I(1) ("The rules of this Convention
shall apply to contractual obligations ...."). See also NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 1,
at 475.
39. See 2 DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 28, at 1191-92. The European Commission
believed unification would increase legal certainty, ease the determination of applicable
law, and prevent forum-shopping. See 2 id.
[VOL. 1: 127, 2000] Contracting Parties' Choice
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
1. autonomy of contracting parties to select a law to govern their
contracts;
2. applicable law based upon closest connection of contracts with
countries in the absence of parties' choice;
3. safeguards for operation of mandatory rules of law of countries
other than those of applicable law;
4. the principle and mechanism of uniform interpretation (and, in the
first case, application) of the Convention as between different
Contracting States. 0
B. Scope and Application
The scope of the Rome Convention is broad and has universal
application. 4 ' The Rome Convention applies regardless of whether the
contract has any connection with a Contracting State of the European
Economic Community.42 As noted, the only requirement for the Rome
Convention's application to an international contractual obligation is
that the dispute must be tried in a Contracting State's court. 3 Therefore,
the Rome Convention applies to parties of non-Contracting States when
a choice of law dispute comes before a Contracting State's court." For
instance, if a contract arises between a United States party and an
Australian party (neither the United States nor Australia are Contracting
States)45and the English court obtains jurisdiction over the contract, the
English court is subject to the rules of the Rome Convention.46  In
40. KAYE, supra note 9, at 2-3. The term "State" in this context can be taken in its
international sense and refers not only to states of the United States, but also to sovereign
nations and their political subdivisions. See DAVID D. SIEGEL, CONFLICTS IN A NUTSHELL
9(1982).
41. See Horlacher, supra note 25, at 176 (noting that the Rome Convention applies
to contractual obligations in situations which involve a choice between the laws of
different countries, even if the law is not that of a Contracting State); see also NORTH &
FAWCETT, supra note 1, at 475 (stating the application of the Rome Convention is
intended to be universal because there is no requirement for either party to the contract to
reside in or be domiciled in a Contracting State; the only requirement is that the dispute
is tried in a Contracting State).
42. See NORTH & FAWCETr, supra note 1, at 475. There is no need for either party
of the contract to be resident or domiciled in a Contracting State for the Rome
Convention to be applicable. See id.
43. See id.
44. See Horlacher, supra note 25, at 176-77.
45. See Rome Convention, supra note 7, at 8-10; Recent Actions, supra note 10.
46. See Horlacher, supra note 25, at 176-77; Rome Convention, supra note 7, at
8-10; Recent Actions, supra note 10.
addition, article 2 of the Rome Convention provides: "Any law specified
by this Convention shall be applied whether or not it is the law of a
Contracting State. 47 For example, noting that neither the United StatesS 48
nor Canada are Contracting States of the Rome Convention, in a
contractual dispute between a United States party and a Canadian party
which is tried before an English court and where the stipulated
governing law is Canadian, the English court must follow the rules of
the Rome Convention when resolving a dispute over the applicable law
of the contract. 49 Thus, article 2 of the Rome Convention "avoids the
need to distinguish for choice of law purposes between the Contracting
States and non-Contracting States, a distinction which would be
particularly difficult to apply to contracts which involve connections
with both a Contracting and a non-Contracting State."5
Article 28 provides that the Rome Convention is open to signature by
the States of the European Economic Community.' While non-
Members of the European Economic Community cannot sign the Rome
Convention, there is nothing to prevent such countries from
incorporating the Rome Convention's rules into their own private
international law.52 The rules of the Rome Convention have universal
appeal as they aid in the unification of private international law and
contractual obligations.
The Rome Convention is intended to apply to international contractual
relations, or contractual situations involving a choice between the laws
47. Rome Convention, supra note 7, art. 2. See generally KAYE, supra note 9, at
143 (arguing that the goal in having a law govern regardless of whether it is the law of a
Contracting or non-Contracting State was to reduce confusion that could result from the
existence of parallel sets of rules governing the choice of laws of Contracting and non-
Contracting States).
48. See Rome Convention, supra note 7, at 8-10; Recent Actions, supra note 10.
49. See NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 1, at 475.
50. Id,
51. Rome Convention, supra note 7, art. 28 ("This Convention shall be open ...
for signature by the States party to the Treaty establishing the European Economic
Community."); see Recent Actions, supra note 10. See also PLENDER, supra note 37, at
8 ("Only States parties to the EEC Treaty may sign the Rome Convention.").
52. See NORTH & FAWCETr, supra note 1, at 460 (noting that Belgium,
Luxembourg, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Germany incorporated the rules of the
Rome Convention into their own private international law prior to the Convention
coming into force in 1991).
53. See Rome Convention, supra note 7, art. 1 ("[R]ules of this Convention shall
apply to contractual obligations in any situation involving a choice between the laws of
different countries.").
Note that the "international contractual relations" requirement excludes from the scope
of the Rome Convention contractual obligations relating to succession and family
relationships. See id. art. l(2)(b). See also Erik Jayme, The Rome Convention on the
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (1980), in INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS AND
CONFLICTS OF LAWS, A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS, 36, 39 (Petar Sarcevic ed. 1990).
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of different countries, but not to domestic disputes. Also excluded
from the scope of the Rome Convention in articles 1(2)(d) and 1(2)(h),
respectively, are arbitration agreements and forum selection agreements
as well as matters of evidence and procedure.5 Under English private
international law, the law of the forum automatically governs all
procedural matters, including evidence. 6 The contractual aspects of
arbitration selection agreements or forum selection agreements will
usually be governed by the same law that governs the contract's
substantive issues.5 7
C. Subordination to Other International Conventions
Just as the Rome Convention rules apply to non-Contracting State
parties when they contract with Contracting State parties, the Rome
Convention also provides that it will not "prejudice the application of
international conventions to which a Contracting State is, or becomes, a
party. 58  This provision follows the "approach of subordinating the
Convention's operation to that of any other international convention
dealing with contracts conflicts."59 Thus, conflicts between the Rome
Convention and other conventions are resolved in favor of the rules of
the other conventions. 0 As a compensating factor, it is possible that the
other competing conventions have gaps that are filled by the conflicts
rules contained in the Rome Convention.6'
54. See KAYE, supra note 9, at 32. Examples of situations involving a choice
between the laws of different countries are as follows: 1) one of the contracting parties is
resident abroad or is a foreign national; 2) the contract is concluded abroad; 3) the
contract is to be performed abroad by one of the parties; and 4) the contract is a purely
English contract but the parties have agreed that the law of another country shall govern
it. See NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 1, at 468.
55. Rome Convention, supra note 7, arts. 1(2)(d), (h).
56. See NORTH & FAWCETr, supra note 1, at 473-74 (noting that the exclusion of
evidence is not total but subject to article 14 of the Rome Convention; article 14 subjects
the evidential matters of the burden of proof and proving a contract to the Rome
Convention rules). The law of the forum will be discussed only indirectly in this
Comment.
57. See 2 DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 28, at 1203. Where there is an express
choice of law included in the contract as a whole, that law will also govern the
interpretation of an arbitration or forum selection agreement. See 2 id.
58. Rome Convention, supra note 7, art. 21.
59. KAYE, supra note 9, at 367. As a result, other conventions prevail over the
Rome Convention. See id.
60. See Jayme, supra note 53, at 41.
61. See id. For example, contractual issues regarding set-offs and limitations
periods are not addressed in Germany's Uniform Sales Law or the Hague Uniform Sales
Currently, the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods (hereinafter the "CISG") is the international
convention most similar to the Rome Convention.62 Like the Rome
Convention, the CISG allows contracts to be governed by the law
chosen by contracting parties, or if the governing law is not explicitly
chosen, by the law which the parties intended to have govern the
contract.63 The CISG "will govern only to the extent that the parties
have not clearly addressed an issue in their agreements .... "'
Therefore, courts could uphold the same general conflicts rules under
both the Rome Convention and the CISG. But it is unlikely that the
CISG and the Rome Convention will ever come into conflict with each
other because of differences in scope and application between the two
conventions.
The CISG is more limited than the Rome Convention in its scope
because the CISG, as stated in article 1(1), applies to "contracts of sale
of goods between parties whose places of business are in different
States: (a) when the States are Contracting States; or (b) when the rules
of private international law lead to the application of the law of a
Contracting State. 65  In contrast, the Rome Convention applies to
disputes involving a choice of law between different countries that are
tried in a Contracting State's court, regardless of whether or not the
parties' places of business are in different States.66 The CISG applies
law, respectively; thus, the Rome Convention is to be applied in cases where those laws
govern. See id.
62. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
Vienna (1980), United Nations Commission on International Trade (UNITRAL), U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.97/18 (1980), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 671 (1980) [hereinafter CISG]. See
generally Susie A. Malloy, Note, The Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable
to International Contracts, Another Piece of the Puzzle of the Law Applicable to
International Contracts, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 662 (1995).
63. See CISG, supra note 62, arts. 7(2), 8(1). Article 7(2) of the CISG states:
"Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not expressly
settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is
based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with the law applicable by
virtue of the rules of private international law." Id. art. 7(2). Article 8(1) of the CISG
states: "For the purposes of this Convention statements made by and other conduct of a
party are to be interpreted according to his intent where the other party knew or could not
have been unaware what that intent was." Id. art. 8(1). See also Malloy, supra note 62,
at 670, 685 (noting that the CISG applies to international sales contracts and includes
rules for interpreting the conduct and statements of parties according to their intent).
64. Marcus G. Larson, Comment, Applying Uniform Sales Law to International
Software Transactions: The Use of the CISG, Its Shortcomings, and a Comparative Look
at How the Proposed UCC Article 2B Would Remedy Them, 5 TUL. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
445, 451 (1997).
65. CISG, supra note 62, art. 1(1).
66. See NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 1, at 475. ("[T]here is no need for either
party to the contract to be domiciled or resident in a European Community Contracting
State. The only thing that matters is that the dispute is tried in a Contracting State to the
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only if the parties have places of business in different Contracting
States.67 An additional limitation of the CISG as compared to the Rome
Convention applies when persons or entities from the United States are
parties to a contract under the CISG. It is interesting to note that the
United States, who is a party to the CISG and whose conflict of laws
rules are compared to those of the Rome Convention later in this
Comment, is not bound by article 1(1)(b) .6  Thus, when the United
States is a party to an international contract, the CISG applies only to
contracts for the sale of goods between parties who are both from CISG
Contracting States,69 of which England is not." For this reason, a
contract with an English party will almost never be governed by the
rules of the CISG.7' Moreover, the Rome Convention is broader in
scope than the CISG because the CISG deals only with contracts
involving the sale of goods" while the Rome Convention covers all
types of international contractual relations. 3
Convention.").
67. See CISG, supra note 62, art. 1(1) (emphasis added).
68. Under article 95 of the CISG (allowing a State to declare that it will not be
bound by article l(l)(b)), the United States has declared a reservation to article l(l)(b)
and is thus not bound by it. See Status of the Convention: Note by the Secretariat, at 5,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/24 (1987).
69. Article l(1)(a) of the CISG states that the "Convention applies to contracts of
sale of goods between parties whose places of business are in different States ... when
the States are Contracting States." CISG, supra note 62, art. l(l)(a). See also Malloy,
supra note 62, at 683-84 ("[T]he C.I.S.G. applies only to contracts for the sale of goods
between parties whose places of business are in different states, which in turn are
contracting states under the C.I.S.G.").
Note that under article 6 of the CISG, parties can exclude the application of the
CISG. See CISG, supra note 62, art. 6. This opt-out provision would allow parties from
Contracting States to eliminate the article l(l)(a) requirement that both parties be from
Contracting States. See id.
70. See CISG, supra note 62. The CISG has been ratified and entered into force in
the United States and various other countries, including: Australia, Austria, Canada,
China, Denmark, France, Germany, Iraq, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and
Switzerland. See id. See also Status of the Convention (last visited Mar. 20, 2000)
<http://www.cnr.it/CRDCS/status.htm>. Note that the United Kingdom (and therefore
England) has not ratified the CISG and therefore its parties will not be governed by the
CISG. See id.
71. The only time a contract with an English party will be governed by the CISG is
if the parties exclude the application of the CISG under article 6. See CISG, supra note
62, art. 6. By excluding the application of the CISG, parties eliminate the article l(l)(a)
requirement that both parties be from Contracting States. See id.
72. See id. art. 1(1).
73. See Rome Convention, supra note 7, art. 1 ("The rules of this Convention shall
apply to contractual obligations .... ); KAYE, supra note 9, at 32 ("The Convention is
meant to apply to international contractual relations ....").
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While the Rome Convention by its own terms provides that conflicts
between it and other international contracts conventions are resolved in
favor of the rules of the other conventions, there are instances where the
Rome Convention's provisions will apply. For instance, the differences
in scope, application, and coverage between the Rome Convention and
the CISG as described above illustrate how the Rome Convention's
provisions will not be subordinated to the CISG's provisions. In the
case of a contract between Rome Convention parties and CISG parties,
an English court, as a non-party to the CISG, would not likely have a
conflict.74 Similarly, if other international conventions are more limited
in scope, application, and coverage that the Rome Convention, such
limitations will allow the application of the Rome Convention's
provisions.
D. The Need to Include an Express Choice of Law Clause
Contracting parties should be aware of the reasons for including
express choice of law provisions in their contracts and of the
consequences of not including such provisions. There is a need to
include a choice of law clause in a contract because "[i]t is not always
possible to predict with certainty which legal system will be applicable
and the determination of the applicable law is often a lengthy and costly
affair. This problem is, of course, easily overcome by including a choice
of law clause in the contract. 75 Certainty in international contracts
protects parties' expectations and produces more predictable results,
regardless of the locality of the dispute resolution.76 Under freedom of
contract principles, parties should be able to rely on a contract's terms
and conditions when they enter into the contract." The United States
Supreme Court reiterated this concept in its decision in Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co.78 when it held:
74. See CISG, supra note 62. The United Kingdom (and by implication, England)
is not a party to the CISG. See id. See also Status of the Convention (last visited Mar.
20, 2000) <http://www.cnr.it/CRDCS/status.htm>.
75. Elbi Janse van Vuuren, Termination of International Commercial Contractsfor Breach of Contract: The Provisions of the UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 583 (1998) (citing Michael J.
Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts: Why? What?
How?, 69 TUL. L. REV. 1121, 1123 (1995)).
76. See Eberhard H. Rohm & Robert Koch, Choice of Law in International
Distribution Contracts: Obstacle or Opportunity?, 11 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1998).
77. See id. at 4. Choice of law stipulations in contracts promote predictability and
certainty. See id. n. 19 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187
cmt. e (1971)).
78. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
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A contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in which disputes shall
be litigated and the law to be applied is, therefore, an almost indispensable
precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to
any international business transaction. Furthermore, such a provision obviates
the danger that a dispute under the agreement might be submitted to a forum
hostile to the interests of one of the parties or unfamiliar with the problem area
involved.79
Parties are at a disadvantage when they fail to include choice of law
clauses in their contracts. Such failure forces courts to apply default
rules in order to complete gaps. ° The "governing law of all contracts
that do not stipulate the applicable law is, in a sense, 'floating' until a
court before which action has been commenced determines the
applicable law, and different jurisdictions have different ideas about
which laws should govern a contract that does not stipulate its own
law.' Consequently, parties must often wait until their legal action
commences and a court decides which law to apply to their contract to
know how its provisions will be enforced. In addition, each court's
interpretation of the applicable law may vary, thus creating the
possibility of uncertain and undesirable outcomes.
E. Default Rules and Resulting Interpretations when an Express Choice
of Law Clause is Not Included (The Rome Convention, Article 4)
In a large number of contract cases, parties do not choose the
governing law.82 Parties may fail to specify a law for various reasons,
including an inability to agree on the governing law, failure to consult an
attorney before contracting," or purposely leaving out a choice of law
provision to favor one party's interests. s Article 4(1) of the Rome
Convention governs applicable law for a contract in the absence of a
choice of a governing law." Article 4(1) states:
79. Id. at 516 (emphasis added). In this case, the Court used the choice of forum
to imply the choice of law. See id. at 518-21.
80. See Michael Whincop & Mary Keyes, Putting the 'Private' Back into Private
International Law: Default Rules and the Proper Law of the Contract, 21 MELB. U. L.
REV. 515, 526 (1997).
81. Michael Gruson, Contractual Choice of Law and Choice of Forum:
Unresolved Issues, 635 PLI/CoMM 349, 367-68 (Oct., 1992).
82. See NORTH & FAWCETr, supra note I, at 487.
83. See id.
84. See Whincop & Keyes, supra note 80, at 524 (discussing the "game theory"
where a party may stay silent with respect to a term of the contract if such a contractual
gap favors his or her interests).
85. Rome Convention, supra note 7, art. 4(1).
To the extent that the law applicable to the contract has not been chosen ... the
contract shall be governed by the law of the country with which it is most
closely connected. Nevertheless, a severable part of the contract which has a
closer connection with another country may by way of exception be governed
by the law of that other country.86
Article 4(2) furnishes presumptions to guide a judge in determining
the law with which the contract is most "closely connected."87  The
contract is presumed to be most closely connected with the law of the
habitual residence (in the case of natural persons) or central
administration (in the case of corporate or unincorporated bodies) of the
party effecting the characteristic performance of the contract. 8  But if the
contract is entered into in the course of a party's trade or profession, that
party's principal (or other) place of business determines the country
presumed to be most closely connected with the contract,8 9 Examining
the application of such provisions in detail does not help clarify or add
certainty to the process of implying a law into a contract; it only
succeeds in confusing matters.
1. The Characteristic Performance/Closest Connection Test (The Rome
Convention, Article 4(2) Presumption)
Historical English contract law generally regarded the place of
performance as a factor that connected a contract to a country. Based
on this concept, it was easy for courts to identify the characteristic
performance of a unilateral contract, where only one party was bound,
such as in the grant of an option to purchase or the offer of a reward for
the return of lost property.9' In these instances, the characteristic
performance was, and would still be, that of the performing party.92 The
Rome Convention upholds this concept for unilateral contracts in articles
4(1) and (2) by providing that the country where the party has his
habitual residence or communications center or principle (or other) place
of business is the country presumed to be most closely connected with
the contract, and that country's law governs. 9'A problem with applying the traditional characteristic performance
86. Id.
87. Id. art. 4(2).
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 1, at 491. This law could present problems
when both parties have to perform in different states. This defect is what the concept of
characteristic performance seeks to avoid by concentrating on the "essential"
performance of the contract. See id.
91. See 2 DIcEY & MORRIS, supra note 28, at 1234.
92. See 2 id.
93. Rome Convention, supra note 7, arts. 4(1), (2).
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test is that typical international contracts are not unilateral contracts, but
rather bilateral contracts between two parties performing in different
countries.9" To address this problem, the Rome Convention uses
characteristic performance as a guideline to determine the applicable
law. The Rome Convention focuses on only one of the parties'
performances-the performance that constitutes the essence of the
contract as a whole.9 In a typical bilateral contract, one party provides
goods or performs services and the other party pays for such goods or
services." Generally, the characteristic performance of a contract is not
the actual payment of money,9" but the performance for which the
payment is due, such as the provision of a service, delivery of goods, or
the granting of the right to use property." For example, in Machinale
Glasfabriek De Maas v. Emaillerie Alsacienne,99 a case in which a Dutch
plaintiff sued a French defendant to recover the price of goods sold and
delivered, the Dutch court held that Dutch law applied in accordance
with article 4(2) of the Rome Convention.' °° This decision was made on
the basis that the plaintiff company, as the seller and manufacturer, was
the party performing the characteristic performance.' ' The court
decided that Dutch law governed because the plaintiff seller's place of
establishment was in the Netherlands.
02
Since all contracts are not standard service or goods contracts, the
actual type of contract must be taken into account in determining its
characteristic performance.' 3  Criteria used to assess characteristic
performance in accordance with article 4 of the Rome Convention for
94. See NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 1, at 491.
95. See id. (noting that the performance that constitutes the essence of the contract
is the performance which is characteristic of the contract as a whole).
96. See id.
97. See Jayme, supra note 53, at 43. Thus,.the seller's law, not the buyer's law,
would apply in a sales contract. See id. The payment of money is not used as the
characteristic performance presumably because it is a common feature of many contracts
and fails to be a distinguishing characteristic between different types of contracts. See
NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 1, at 492.
98. See NORTH & FAWCETr, supra note 1, at 491.
99. 1984 E.C.R. 123, 2 C.M.L.R. 281 (1985).
100. See NORTH & FAWCETr, supra note 1, at 491 (citing Machinale Glasfabriek De
Maas BV v. Emaillerie Alsacienne S.A., 1984 E.C.R. 123, 2 C.M.L.R. 281 (1985)).
101. See NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 1, at 491. This decision complies with the
idea that the seller's law would apply in a typical sales contract. See Jayme, supra note
53, at 43.
102. The Netherlands was the plaintiff's place of establishment at the time that the
contract was made. See Machinale Glasfabriek De Maas BV, 2 C.M.L.R. at 281.
103. See KAYE, supra note 9, at 180.
non-standard contracts suggests "(i) the particular performance should
be the most significant for the type of contract in question; and (ii) in
addition, the performance should be the most significant under the actual
contract of that type, which may contain special or unusual or additional
terms .... "'04
Despite article 4(2)'s emphasis on characteristic performance, the
rules do not actually apply the law of the place of such performance.
Instead, article 4(2) presumes that the contract is most closely connected
with the country where the party effecting the characteristic performance
has its habitual residence (if an individual), central administration, or
principle place of business (if a corporate or unincorporated body).' 5
This presumption emphasizes the performance of the contract as only
one of many connecting factors; the traditional English law that a
contract is presumed to be governed by the place of performance is no
longer a decisive factor under the Rome Convention."
2. Non-Application and Rebuttal of the Rome Convention, Article 4(2)
Presumption (as Determined by the Rome Convention, Article 4(5))
Adding complication to the determination of governing law is article
4(5) of the Rome Convention. Article 4(5) provides that the
presumption in article 4(2), the characteristic performance test, will not
apply if the "characteristic performance can not be determined, and...
if it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract is more
closely connected with another country.'.. 7  This causes a problem of
circular reasoning, as "Article 4(5) ... directs that the governing law of
the contract shall be determined by the closest connection, which
according to [A]rticle 4(2) cannot be found."' ' As a result, it is difficult
to determine how a court can decide if it is appropriate to rebut the
presumption unless the court has first applied the closest connection
104. Id. (noting that special, unusual, or additional terms may have the effect of
reducing what could otherwise have been the most significant aspect of a performance
obligation under contracts of such type).
105. See Rome Convention, supra note 7, art. 4(2).
106. See 2 DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 28, at 1233. "It is important to note that
the presumption leads not to the place of characteristic performance, but to the residence,
or central administration, or principal place of business, or other place of business ... of
the party who is to effect the characteristic performance." 2 id.
107. Rome Convention, supra note 7, art. 4(5). See also NORTH & FAWCETr, supra
note 1, at 494 (noting that the power to rebut the presumption found in article 4(5)
provides flexibility and was thought to be necessary to accommodate the large number of
different types of contracts that are dealt with under the Convention).
108. Horlacher, supra note 25, at 187 (noting that the circular structure of article 4
arises when the "characteristic performance" of a contract is indeterminable; in this case,
the Rome Convention offers the judge no help and he can determine the applicable law
based on any standard he chooses).
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test.'" This suggests that the process of determining the applicable law
starts with a presumption and then goes on to the closest connection test
to determine if the presumption can be rebutted."0
a. Non-Application of the Article 4(2) Presumption
One situation in which the article 4(2) presumption of the closest
connection (determined through the characteristic performance test) does
not apply is when the characteristic performance of the contract is
indeterminable."' When the characteristic performance of the contract is
indeterminable, the applicable law has to be determined using the closest
connection approach under article 4(1). "2 A barter contract is an
example of this, where "it is impossible to say that one party's
performance is more characteristic of the contract than the other' s."' 13 In
such a case, article 4(5) of the Rome Convention provides that the
characteristic performance presumption does not apply and the court
must look to the country that the contract is most closely connected to
(from article 4(1)) to determine which law to apply."4
b. Rebuttal of the Article 4(2) Presumption
Another situation in which the article 4(2) presumption of the closest
connection (determined through the characteristic performance test) does
not apply is if the circumstances surrounding the contract tend to be
more closely connected to another country than to the country that is
related to the characteristic performance of the contract.' 5 One example
109. See NORTH & FAWCETr, supra note 1, at 487 (noting that it is not clear whether
article 4 of the Rome Convention intends a one, two, or three stage process because its
provisions aim to combine certainty, as provided by the presumptions, with flexibility,
provided by the closest connection test, and an escape provision, provided by the power
to rebut the presumptions).
110. See id.
111. See Rome Convention, supra note 7, art. 4(5) ("[P]aragraph 2 [referring to
article 4(2)'s closest connection presumption] shall not apply if the characteristic
performance cannot be determined .....
112. See id.
113. NORTH & FAWCETr, supra note 1, at 491-92. See also 2 DICEY & MORRIS,
supra note 28, at 1237.
114. Rome Convention, supra note 7, art. 4(5). See also NORTH & FAWCETr, supra
note 1, at 494.
115. See Rome Convention, supra note 7, art. 4(5). See also NORTH & FAWCETr,
supra note 1, at 494 (noting all article 4 presumptions are disregarded if the contract is
more closely connected with another country).
of when the article 4(2) presumption will be rebutted is when the
contract's place of performance is a country where the party has a place
of business, but such place is not its principal place of business."6
Another example of when the article 4(2) presumption will be rebutted is
when the country of habitual residence of the party effecting the
contract's characteristic performance is not the most closely connected
country.' 7 Article 4(5) will rebut the article 4(2) presumption in a case
where an Englishman travels to Spain on vacation and the hotel where
he is staying pays him to perform a service for the hotel."'  In this
situation, the presumption under article 4(2) that English law governs as
that of the habitual residence of the characteristic performer is rebutted
under article 4(5) because Spanish law is the law most closely connected
with the transaction." 9  The contract is more closely connected to
Spanish than English law because the contract was executed and
performed in Spain and Spain is also the principal place of business of
one of the parties.20 While the article 4(5) provision provides flexibility
for dealing with different types of contracts, "the price for this flexibility
is the risk of uncertainty and lack of predictability, thus defeating the
object of the presumptions."''
3. Djpeage
If parties fail to express a choice of law, article 4(1) of the Rome
Convention allows dipeqage to help supplement the closest connection
test that a court must use to imply a governing law into a contract.1
2
Dipegage is the application of a different governing law to severable
116. See 2 DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 28, at 1238. For example, an English law
firm may advise its American client on an English legal matter through its law firm in
Los Angeles. The presumption in this case would suggest that California law would
govern the attorney/client contract, but this presumption would be rebutted and English
law would govern because the law that the contract is most closely connected with is
English law. See 2 id.
117. See KAYE, supra note 9, at 186 (arguing that the article 4(5) provision that
allows the presumption to be rebutted is the "get-out clause").
118. See id.
119. See id. (noting that Spanish law is the law most closely connected to the
contract under article 4(l) of the Rome Convention when all circumstances are
considered).
120. See id.
121. NORTH & FAWCETr, supra note 1, at 494 (noting that the power to rebut the
presumption was included in order to accommodate the many different types of contracts
that come under the Rome Convention because the Rome Convention has few
specialized rules for specific types of contracts).
122. Rome Convention, supra note 7, art. 4(I). See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
448 (7th ed. 1999) (defining ddpeqage as a "court's application of different state laws to
different issues in a legal dispute; choice of law on an issue-by-issue basis"); Horlacher,
supra note 25, at 186.
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parts of a contract' 23 if such parts of the contract have closer connections
to other countries than the rest of the contract does. Article 4(1) states
that if part of the contract is independent from the rest of the contract,
that independent part can be severed from it.
125
Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co.126 is a case where
d~peage was used to sever a contract.12 In that case, the plaintiff, a
Libyan bank, had a contract with the defendant, Banker's Trust, for use
of bank accounts at the defendant's London and New York branches.'
28
During this time, the United States was experiencing poor relations with
Libya and the President of the United States issued an order blocking
access to and transactions with all Libyan property which was located in
the United States.' 29  English law at that time did not prohibit such
transactions with Libya.'" When the Libyan bank brought suit for the
amounts which would have been transferred by the defendant from its
New York branch on plaintiff s behalf, the English court decided that the
single contract between the two parties was to be governed in part by
English law and in part by New York law. 3 '
In general, the court must go through various steps to imply a
governing law into a contract. The court must determine: 1) the
characteristic performance of a contract, 2) the country with which the
contract is most closely connected, 3) times when the presumption will
not apply, 4) times when the presumption will be rebutted, and 5)
123. See Horlacher, supra note 25, at 186-87 (noting the provision for d~pecage
was included in the Rome Convention despite the infrequency of severable contracts in
practice).
124. See Rome Convention, supra note 7, art. 4(1). Article 4(1) states:
To the extent that the law applicable to the contract has not been chosen... the
contract shall be governed by the law of the country with which it is most
closely connected. Nevertheless, a severable part of the contract which has a
closer connection with another country may by way of exception be governed
by the law of that other country.
Id.
125. See id. See also NORTH & FAwcETr, supra note 1, at 489 (stating that it is
unclear whether article 4(1) provides the court with discretion on whether or not to sever
a contract).
126. 1 Q.B. 728 (1989).
127. See id.




131. See id. at 747 (noting that there is authority supporting the treatment of branch
banks as separate from the head office).
different laws that should be applied to different parts of the contract if
the contract is severable. These steps all create additional and
unnecessary uncertainty and confusion for the courts (and the parties) to
imply a governing law into the contract compared to English common
law as previously discussed.' Thus, parties should be aware of the
complexity caused when no law is chosen and should choose a law to
govern the contract in order to simplify matters and add certainty to the
contracting process.
F. Including a Choice of Law Clause (The Rome Convention, Article 3)
1. Party Autonomy ("Freedom of Choice")'33
While the article 4 rules for contracts that do not have choice of law
clauses are cumbersome, uncertain, and confusing, the rules in article 3,
which apply when parties do express their choice of law in their
contracts, are clearer and more easily applied. This provides efficiency
and certainty for both the parties and courts involved. Article 3, sections
(1) and (2) provide:
1. A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. The choice
must be expressed or demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the terms
of the contract or the circumstances of the case. By their choice the parties
can select the law applicable to the whole or a part only of the contract.
2. The parties may at any time agree to subject the contract to a law other than
that which previously governed it .... 134
The basic principle that article 3 expresses is that of party autonomy. 35
Party autonomy is a universal concept found throughout national
132. See supra Part III ("PRE CONTRACTS ACT AND PRE ROME CONVENTION:
ENGLISH COMMON LAW AND CONFLICT OF LAWS RULES FOR INTERNATIONAL
CONTRACTS"). Note that English common law would imply a law into the contract based
on the terms of the contract, general circumstances of the case, or the system with which
the transaction had its closest and most real connection when no express choice of law
had been made. See 2 DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 28, at 1189. The Rome Convention
continues to apply the same terms of the proper law test but also forces courts to consider
rebuttable presumptions in conjunction with the basic tests in absence of express choice
of law. See KAYE, supra note 9, at 442.
133. The title of article 3 of the Rome Convention is "Freedom of choice." See
Rome Convention, supra note 7, art. 3.
134. Rome Convention, supra note 7, arts. 3(1), (2).
135. See Rohm & Koch, supra note 76, at 10. Various authorities and scholars refer
to article 3 as the section of the Rome Convention that allows party autonomy. See 2
DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 28, at 1211 (stating that article 3 expresses the basic
principle of party autonomy); KAYE, supra note 9, at 147 (stating that article 3 enshrines
the principle of autonomy in contract choice of law); Horlacher, supra note 25, at 177
(stating that article 3 gives multinational parties the ability and freedom to specify the
law they wish to have govern their contracts).
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systems of private international law. 36 This concept allows parties to
make choices based on their own particular interests. "[A]lthough the
concept [of party autonomy] behind article 3 is not original, the amount
of freedom the article allows the parties is."' 37 The Rome Convention
allows parties this freedom without requiring any connection between
the choice of law and the transaction.'38 In this respect, article 3 of the
Rome Convention differs from analogous conflict of laws provisions in
other countries,' including the United States.' 40 One reason parties may
desire to have a non-related law govern their contract, especially when
the parties are from different countries, is to avoid offering either party
an advantage. A neutral law will be stipulated in such instances.' In
addition, while the law may have no apparent connection with the
transaction, there could be an underlying connection which is not
evident on the face of the contract, such as laws that both parties are
familiar with, laws of a particular country that are more fully developed
regarding a certain type of contract, or laws of the country where the
contract's financing or insurance are effected.'
4 2
136. See KAYE, supra note 9, at 147.
137. Horlacher, supra note 25, at 193. One example of this freedom is the fact that
there is no requirement that there be a correlation between the law chosen and the
contract; many other countries, including the United States, have this requirement. See
id. See also infra Part V ("CONFLICT OF LAWS RULES FOR UNITED STATES CONTRACTS
COMPARED TO INTERNATIONAL ENGLISH CONTRACTS").
138. See 2 DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 28, at 1213-14 (noting that although the
chosen law frequently does have some connection with the transaction, it sometimes
happens that a law is chosen that has no connection, or no apparent connection, with the
transaction).
139. See Horlacher, supra note 25, at 177 (the provision in article 3 of the Rome
Convention contains no reasonable connection test).
140. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(a) (1971)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. This section states: "The law of the state chosen by the
parties to govern their contractual rights and duties will be applied.., unless... (a) the
chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and there is
no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice." Id. See also infra Part V ("CONFLICT
OF LAWS RULES FOR UNITED STATES CONTRACTS COMPARED TO INTERNATIONAL ENGLISH
CONTRACTS").
141. See 2 DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 28, at 1213-14 (noting that it is common
for parties of large contracts dealing with state-owned entities in certain countries to
choose a neutral law to govern the contract).
142. See 2 id. (explaining that many commercial transactions which seem to have
no apparent connection to England are frequently not only financed, but also insured in
the City of London). Certain types of standardized commercial contracts, especially
insurance and maritime contracts, have been more fully developed in English
commercial and legal practice than elsewhere in the world. See 2 id. at 1214. See also
NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 1, at 483.
Moreover, as provided for in article 3(2) of the Rome Convention, the
parties have the freedom to change the law they initially agreed to have
govern the contract to another law; this is a freedom that was not
necessarily available under English common law.143 The English court
held in E. Du Pont De Nemours and Co. v. LC. Agnew'" that while
there must be an applicable law that governs the contract, it is "possible
for a proper law to be retrospectively varied on exercise of a contractual
option.",145  The article 3(2) provision acts as a formalistic bandage
"applied to reconcile an emphasis on ex ante specification, while
preserving the party's right to make choices necessary to relational
flexibility.' 46
Flexibility can also be seen in other provisions of article 3 of the
Rome Convention, specifically in article 3(1).147  As the concept of
dpeqage could be implied into a contract in article 4(1), it is again
present in article 3(1), and allows parties who stipulate their choice of
law to apply that law to the entire contract or to parts of it.'48 Contractual
dgpegage can take various forms.' 49 Parties can agree that the chosen
law applies only to certain aspects of the contract, or that the duties and
rights of one party are governed by a law different from the law
governing the entire contract, or that different laws apply to different
parts or issues of the contract.'5 Thus, by stipulating different governing
laws for different parts of their contracts, parties can truly tailor each
detail in their contracts to their own interests and ensure the manner in
which the transactions will be carried out.
143. Rome Convention, supra note 7, art. 3(2); see KAYE, supra note 9, at 442.
Article 3(2) of the Rome Convention allows parties to subsequently alter the applicable
law but it was uncertain under pre-existing English common law whether subsequent
alteration of the proper law was allowed. See supra Part III ("PRE CONTRACTS ACT AND
PRE ROME CONVENTION: ENGLISH COMMON LAW AND CONFLICT OF LAWS RULES FOR
INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS").
144. 2 Lloyd's Rep. 585 (C.A. 1987), appeal dismissed, 2 Lloyd's Rep. 240 (C.A.
1988).
145. Id. at 592.
146. Whincop & Keyes, supra note 80, at 541.
147. Rome Convention, supra note 7, art. 3(l).
148. Rome Convention, supra note 7, arts. 4(1), 3(1). Article 4(1) states: "[A]
severable part of the contract which has a closer connection with another country may by
way of exception be governed by the law of that other country." Id. Article 3(1) states:
"By their choice the parties can select the law applicable to the whole or a part only of
the contract." Id.
149. See Gruson, supra note 81, at 364.
150. See id.
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2. Limitations on the Ability to Stipulate Choice of Law
a. Demonstrated with Reasonable Certainty
The requirement in article 3(1) of the Rome Convention that the
choice of law must be demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the
circumstances of the case or terms of the contract. indicates that the
parties should clearly and succinctly stipulate the law(s) they wish to
have govern the contract. Determining whether parties have expressed a
choice of law in their contract is usually not difficult. In English
practice, phrases that indicate that the contract is "governed by,"
"subject to," or "to be construed in accordance with" a particular law are
effective choice of law provisions. 2
But even when parties clearly express their intentions, courts will
generally not uphold an express clause that makes application of the
laws confusing or uncertain. '53 Dubai Electricity Co. v. Iran Shipping
Lines 1-4 is an example of an English case where an express provision was
not upheld due to uncertainty.'55 In that case, the parties stipulated that
the defendant carrier had the choice of German, Iranian, or English law
to govern the contract.'5 6 The contract did not state circumstances to
indicate which law should be used; the court implied German law as the
governing law (under the closest connection test).' 57  The court
invalidated the choice of law clause because the contract provided no
guidance to indicate the circumstances under which each of the three
laws should be chosen.'58 The court was forced to rely on article 4(1) of
the Rome Convention to determine the governing law even though
parties had stipulated their own choice of laws because the stipulation
was not demonstrated with reasonable certainty as required by article
3(1).
A court looks at various factors to determine if express provisions are
151. Rome Convention, supra note 7, art. 3(1).
152. 2 DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 28, at 1217-18.
153. See KAYE, supra note 9, at 150.
154. 2 Lloyd's Rep. 380 (Q.B. 1984).
155. See id. In this case, the defendant's vessel was carrying cargo for the plaintiff
under a contract which stated that the contract of carriage, bill of lading, and all other
related disputes should, at the carrier's option, be governed either by German, Iranian, or




demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the circumstances of the case
or terms of the contract, as required by article 3(1) of the Rome
Convention. '59 When a court looks to "circumstances of the case," it
considers matters such as the parties' residence or nationality, location
and nature of subject matter, and connection with a previous or related
transaction that was subject to a chosen law.' 6° Similarly, "terms of the
contract" include a choice of jurisdiction, use of a particular language,
selection of currency for payment, use of standard documentation or
forms, and reference to provisions of a certain law. 161
b. Public Policy
Under article 16 of the Rome Convention, a court can refuse
application of a chosen law "if such application is manifestly
incompatible with the public policy ... of the forum."'' 62  A mere
difference between the law of the forum and the chosen foreign law is
not enough to justify exclusion of foreign law on public policy
grounds. 6 It must be shown that "the application of a foreign rule of
law is against the forum's public policy. [To do this,] [t]he
circumstances of the case have to be considered.""6  Courts will
recognize and enforce a foreign law unless doing so would "violate
some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of
good morals, [or] some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal.' 65
For example, if a contract governed by German law prevents a party
from competing in England, then applying a German rule that allows
restraint of trade is contrary to the English public policy against the
restraint of trade. 6 6 Ralli Brothers v. Compaiiia Naviera Sota y Aznar16 1
is another example where a violation of public policy forbids the
159. See KAYE, supra note 9, at 152. These factors correspond to those used to
imply a choice of law under early English conflicts of law principles. See id.
160. Id. at 153. Regarding a connection with a previous or related transaction, such
circumstances should be assessed according to their evidential weight as an indication of
a possible shared intent between the parties and not according to their objective weight
regarding the closest connection with the chosen law. See id.
161. Id. at 152.
162. Rome Convention, supra note 7, art. 16. Presumably the provision's scope is
limited to the forum's public policy as it is used in a private international context rather
than in the context of domestic public policy. See KAYE, supra note 9, at 345.
163. See 2 DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 28, at 1277.
164. NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note I, at 504.
165. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 111 (1918) (holding that a New
York court will uphold a Massachusetts statute as long as the statute doesn't violate New
York public policy).
166. See NORTH & FAWCETr, supra note 1, at 504.
167. 2 K.B. 287 (C.A. 1920).
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application of a foreign law.' 68 In this case, a contract was held to be
unenforceable in English courts because performance of the contract was
illegal under the law of the foreign place of performance (Spain). 69 Lord
Justice Scrutton stated that "where a contract requires an act to be done
in a foreign country, it is ... an implied term of the continuing validity
of such a provision that the act to be done in the foreign country shall
not be illegal by the law of that country."' 7 °
It is not always necessary for the foreign contract to have a connection
with England in order for English public policy to apply. 7' Foreign
contracts that are contrary to "an essential moral interest" or "contrary to
morality" are not enforceable in an English court even if the only
connection with England is that England is the forum for a claim under
the contract.7 2 Examples of such contracts against general moral interest
include contracts involving trade with enemy nations, restraint of trade,
corruption and collusion, or suppressing a criminal prosecution.'73
In addition, a contract may not be enforceable if the circumstances
under which it was made, not necessarily its substance, conflict with
English notions of morality and justice. 7 4 In Kaufman v. Gerson,'75 the
King's Bench dismissed an otherwise valid contract as against essential
moral interest because the circumstances it was entered into were
considered coercive by the English court. 76 In this case, the contract
168. See id. In this case, an English firm chartered a Spanish ship from a Spanish
firm to carry cargo from India to Spain. Before the ship arrived, the Spanish government
issued a decree that established a maximum amount that could be paid per ton of freight.
The contract terms exceeded that maximum amount and an action was brought in
England to recover the balance. The action was unsuccessful as performance was illegal
under Spanish law. See id.
169. See id.
170. Id. at 304.
171. See id. See also 2 DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 28, at 1278.
172. See 2 DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 28, at 1278 (citing Kaufman v. Gerson, 1
K.B. 591, 598,600 (C.A. 1904)).
173. See 2 id. at 1278-79.
174. See 2 id. at 1279.
175. Kaufman, 1 K.B. at 591.
176. See id. In this case, the French defendant's husband misappropriated money
he was entrusted with by the French plaintiff. The defendant agreed in a contract to pay
the plaintiff the amount misappropriated in return for an agreement not to prosecute him
for what was a crime under French law. The contract was valid under French law and
the law governing the contract was to be French law. But because enforcing such a
contract would be against English public policy, the English court refused to enforce the
contract. See id. See also KAYE, supra note 9, at 245 (explaining that the court would
not enforce, on the ground of coercion, a French contract to pay misappropriated money
in exchange for an agreement not to prosecute in France).
was between French parties and French law was to govern; the contract
would have been a valid contract under French law, but because the case
was heard by an English court, the court held that it would be against
English public policy to enforce a contract entered into under coercion.'77
While the prevailing view is that the law governing the contract
determines whether the contract is void or voidable as against the public
policy of that country, as evident in Kaufman v. Gerson,' it is possible
that acts of duress, fraud, or coercion are so shocking that the court will





Article 3(3) of the Rome Convention refers to the application of a
country's "mandatory rules."' 8 For contracts with an express choice of
law, article 3(3) defines "mandatory rules" as "rules of the law of [a]
country which cannot be derogated from by contract."'8 ' Mandatory
rules are domestic rules that are considered to be so important that they
must apply, as a matter of policy or construction, in any action that
comes before a forum court.' Mandatory rules apply even if a foreign
law is selected to govern the contract. 3 An example of an English
mandatory rule is contained in the Unfair Contract Terms Act and deals
with controls on clauses in contracts that exempt parties from liability.'
8 4
In certain circumstances, the Unfair Contract Terms Act requires these
controls to apply regardless of the parties' choice of a foreign governing
177. See Kaufman, I K.B. at 591.
178. Id.
179. See id. See also Dimskal Shipping Co. S.A. v. Int'l Transp. Workers Fed'n, 2
App. Cas. 152, 168 (H.L. 1992) (holding that English law as the governing law
determined whether the contract was void or voidable as a result of economic duress); In
re Missouri Steamship Co., 42 Ch. D. 321, 336 (C.A. 1889) (refusing application by an
English court of an American mandatory rule on the ground that an immoral contract is
void all over the world and will not be enforced by any country); 2 DICEY & MORRIS,
supra note 28, at 1279.
180. Rome Convention, supra note 7, art. 3(3).
181. Id.
182. See NORTH & FAWCET', supra note 1, at 137. Note that the concept of
mandatory rules has been introduced only recently into English law.
183. See id.
184. Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977, § 27(2) (Eng.) ("This Act has effect
notwithstanding any contract term which applies or purports to apply the law of some
country outside the United Kingdom .... ). See also NORTH & FAWCETr, supra note 1,
at 480 (explaining that the Unfair Contract Terms Act makes it clear that the controls
will apply, in certain circumstances, despite the parties' express choice of foreign
governing law).
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law. "' After the governing law of the contract is determined (likely
through an express choice of law clause), the forum court must apply
that country's rules to decide if the rules are mandatory or not. '
"[W]hether a rule is internationally mandatory depends on the...
express or implied... rules of scope of application attached to it and not
upon the [forum's] choice of law rules .. ,,87 This distinction is well
established in the laws of certain Contracting States.'
Article 3(3) of the Rome Convention states:
The fact that the parties have chosen a foreign law.., shall not, where all the
other elements relevant to the situation at the time of the choice are connected
with one country only, prejudice the application of rules of the law of that
country which cannot be derogated from by contract, hereinafter called
'mandatory rules." 89
This provision applies to situations where there is an essentially
domestic contract which becomes a conflict of laws issue solely by the
parties' choice of a foreign law. 9 ° The effect of applying a country's
mandatory rules to a contract is not to destroy the contract, but to
override the parties' choice of law for the issue relating to the mandatory
law.' 9' When a mandatory rule applies regardless of the governing law,
the parties' express choice of foreign law will be limited to the extent
required by the mandatory rule and the court will apply the chosen law
for purposes unconnected with the mandatory rule.'92
185. See NORTH & FAWCETr, supra note 1, at 137. See also PLENDER, supra note
37, at 121 ("The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 imposes statutory controls on the
freedom of parties to a contract to exclude or limit liability for negligence or liability
arising in contract and it prohibits unreasonable indemnity clauses.").
186. See PLENDER, supra note 37, at 154. See also NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note
1, at 497-98.
187. PLENDER, supra note 37, at 154 (citing A. Philip, Mandatory Rules, Public
Law (Political Rules) and Choice of Law in the EEC Convention on the Law Applicable
to Contractual Obligations, in CONTRACT CONFLICTS 81, 82 (P. North ed., 1982)).
188. See PLENDER, supra note 37, at 154 (noting that the distinction between
mandatory rules determined by scope of application and those which are mandatory
because they relate to contracts governed by the law of the country that created the
relevant rule is well established in some Contracting States' laws).
189. Rome Convention, supra note 7, art. 3(3).
190. See NORTH & FAWCETr, supra note 1, at 480. Article 3(3) of the Rome
Convention limits the right to choose in a situation such as this, but only to the extent of
maintaining the mandatory rules of the country where all other important connections
with the contract are located. See id. The structure of the Rome Convention suggests
that a foreign country's mandatory rules, and not the forum's mandatory rules, will be
applied. See id. at 480-81.
191. See id. at 480.
192. See id.
Article 3(3)'s effect on the mandatory rules stipulated in the Unfair
Contract Terms Act'93 can be illustrated by a hypothetical case in which
a completely English contract contains an exemption clause and a
French choice of law clause.'94 If such a case is brought before the court
of any Contracting State, the court would determine that the parties'
choice of French law was made with the intention of escaping the
English controls on exemption clauses, and as such, the court would
apply the related exemption clause controls from the Unfair Contract
Terms Act.'95
While it may seem that invoking mandatory rules to override parties'
chosen laws contradicts the concept of party autonomy (as provided in
article 3 of the Rome Convention), "[the Rome] Convention provisions
that regulate party autonomy, [such as the mandatory rules provision],
are the exception rather than the general rule."' 19 6 For example, a court
can override mandatory rules if such rules are in conflict with the
forum's public policy (under article 16 (as described above)).9
Therefore, an English court can refuse to apply a foreign country's
mandatory rules if the application of those mandatory rules would go
against English public policy.'99 This type of situation was present in In
re Missouri Steamship Co.,199 where a contract made in the United States
between an American citizen and a British company contained a clause
that was valid under English law but void under the law of the United
States as being against public policy.2°° The English court held that
193. Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977, §§ 2, 3 (Eng.). §§ 2, 3 state:
§ 2(1) A person cannot by reference to any contract term or to a notice
given to persons generally or to particular persons exclude or restrict his
liability for death or personal injury resulting from negligence.
§ 2(2) In the case of other loss or damage, a person cannot so exclude or
restrict his liability for negligence except in so far as the term or notice satisfies
the requirement of reasonableness.
§ 3(1) This section applies as between contracting parties where one of
them deals as consumer or on the other's written standard terms of business.
§ 3(2) As against that party, the other cannot by reference to any contract
term ... when himself in breach of contract, exclude or restrict any liability of
his in respect of the breach ....
Id.
194. See NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 1, at 480.
195. See id.
196. Horlacher, supra note 25, at 179.
197. See Rome Convention, supra note 7, arts. 3(3), 7(1), 16.
198. See NORTH & FAWCETr, supra note 1, at 504. This type of situation could
occur in cases where a foreign mandatory rule conflicts with an English mandatory rule.
See id.
199. 42 Ch. D. 321 (C.A. 1889).
200. See id. at 336. In this case, the contract was made in Massachusetts between a
United States citizen and a British company of shipowners for the transport of cattle
from Massachusetts to England in an English ship. See id. at 321. The contract
contained a clause which stated that the shipping company would not be liable for the
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English law governed the contract. 20' The court did not apply the United
States mandatory law based on the reasoning that "[w]here a contract is
void on the ground of immorality ... then the contract would be void all
over the world, and no civili[z]ed country would be called on to enforce
it.'' 2°2 Because the United Kingdom, and therefore England, made a
reservation in article 7(1) not to give effect to the mandatory rules of the
law of the country with the closest connection, 03 English courts have
flexibility in deciding which country's mandatory rules to apply.
2. Article 7(1) and Its Non-Application in England
Article 7(1) of the Rome Convention provides that:
When applying ... the law of a country, effect may be given to the mandatory
rules of the law of another country with which the situation has a close
connection, if and in so far as, under the law of the latter country, those rules
must be applied whatever the law applicable to the contract. 204
This provision applies to both article 3 contracts (where parties express a
choice of law) and to article 4 contracts (where parties do not express a
choice of law). It is considered "the widest of the provisions on the
mandatory rules and is also the least clear" due to the fact that it refers to
any country's mandatory rules with which there is a close connection
and gives the forum discretion on whether or not to apply such rules.2°5
It is due to the uncertainty caused by this provision that article 22(1)(a)
of the Rome Convention provides an escape clause which reserves the
right for Member States not to apply the provisions of article 7(1).206 On
negligence of the ship's master or crew. This clause, while valid under English law, was
void under United States law as against public policy. The cause of action related to the
loss of cattle due to the negligence of the master and crew. The English court held that
the parties intended the contract to be governed by English law, and as such, because the
clause was only against United States public policy, but was not immoral or forbidden, it
was enforced by the English court. See id.
201. See id. See also Whincop & Keyes, supra note 80, at 529 (citing In re
Missouri Steamship Co., 42 Ch. D. 321 (C.A. 1889)).
202. In re Missouri Steamship Co., 42 Ch. D. at 336.
203. See Rome Convention, supra note 7, art. 7(1). The United Kingdom reserved
the right not to apply article 7(1) (mandatory rules of foreign countries) when they
ratified the Convention. See NORTH & FAWCETr, supra note 1, at 461. As a result, this
provision does not have force in the United Kingdom. See id.; infra Part IV.F.2.c.2.
("Article 7(1) and Its Non-Application in England").
204. Rome Convention, supra note 7, art. 7(1).
205. NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 1, at 503. These two features lead to
uncertainty in the law and have been objected to by many Contracting States. See id.
206. Rome Convention, supra note 7, art. 22(1)(a) ("Any Contracting State may, at
ratifying the Rome Convention, the United Kingdom made the
reservation not to apply article 7(1); as a consequence, this provision is
not in force in England. °7
3. Article 3(3) as Compared to Article 7(1)
While article 3(3) of the Rome Convention provides that parties'
choice of a foreign law shall not prejudice the application of the
mandatory rules of another country when all relevant connections to the
contract are with that other country, article 7(1) gives effect to the
mandatory laws of another country when there is a close connection
between the transaction and the other country . 8 The difference between
the two provisions is that article 3(3) requires all relevant elements other
than the choice of law clause to have a connection to one country before
its mandatory rules are applicable. 9 In contrast, article 7(1) requires
only a close connection to that country before its mandatory rules are
applicable.20
The close connection in article 7(1) of the Rome Convention that may
require the mandatory rules of a country to be invoked is described as "a
genuine connection with the other country... a merely vague
connection is not adequate.",21' Examples of true close connectionsS 212
include a party's main place of business or residence. Because article
7(1) is governed by a more "flexible" standard than article 3(3) as it
allows courts the choice of whether or not to apply a foreign country's
mandatory laws, a court can easily justify non-application of mandatory
rules under article 7(1).213
the time of signature, ratification, acceptance or approval, reserve the right not to apply:(a) the provisions of Article 7(1) .... "). See also Horlacher, supra note 25, at 189(noting that the Convention gives States the right to abstain from applying article 7(1)).
207. This reservation not to apply article 7(1) applies to England as part of the
United Kingdom. See Contracts (Applicable Law) Act, 1990, § 2(2) (Eng.) ("Articles
7(1) and 10(l)(e) of the Rome Convention shall not have the force of law in the United
Kingdom."). See also 2 DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 28, at 1243; NORTH & FAWCETr,
supra note l, at 461.
Germany, Ireland, and Luxembourg also made reservations not to apply article
7(1). See 2 DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 28, at 1243.
208. Rome Convention, supra note 7, arts. 3(3), 7(1).
209. See Horlacher, supra note 25, at 179.
210. See id.
211. Rohm & Koch, supra note 76, at I I (citing Mario Guliano & Paul Lagarde, A
Report on the Convention, Oct. 31, 1980, O.J.E.C. 23/C 282, at 27).
212. See Rohm & Koch, supra note 76, at 11.
213. See Horlacher, supra note 25, at 189. In determining whether to exercise a
country's mandatory rules, a court should consider the nature and purpose of the rules as
well as the consequences that would result from their application or non-application. See
id. It was rare for courts under English common law to apply foreign mandatory rules.
See KAYE, supra note 9, at 240. When English common law courts did apply foreign
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d. Exclusion of Renvoi (The Rome Convention, Article 15)
Renvoi is a doctrine that allows a court to adopt the conflict of laws
rules of another country, instead of its own, to determine the applicable
law.214 Article 15 of the Rome 'Convention excludes the application of
renvoi for all contracts that come under it, including article 3 contracts
(where parties express a choice of law) and article 4 contracts (where
parties do not express a choice of law).2"' Consider the case where an
English company and a French company form a contract containing a
United States choice of law clause."6 Even if the contract has a close
connection with the United States, the Rome Convention's exclusion of
the application of renvoi forbids the forum court from applying United
States conflict of laws rules to determine what law governs the
contract . 7 Instead, the forum court must apply United States substantive
rules in accordance with English conflict of laws rules.2 8 The Rome
Convention requires that "the connection with a given legal system is a
connection with substantive legal principles, not with conflict of laws
rules. 2 9 This requirement ensures that Contracting States always apply
their own conflict of laws rules in conjunction with the applicable
substantive law.
mandatory rules, they did so to maintain international comity and foreign relations. See
id. See also Lorentzen v. Lydden & Co., 2 K.B. 202 (1942) (where extraterritorial effect
was given to a foreign degree on public policy grounds).
England's current views on the application of foreign mandatory laws are consistent
with their common law views, as evidenced by the United Kingdom's choice to opt-out
of article 7(1). See KAYE, supra note 9, at 249. As a result; it is equally rare for English
courts to apply foreign mandatory rules under the Rome Convention. See id.
214. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1300 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "renvoi" as
"[t]he doctrine under which a court in resorting to foreign law adopts as well the foreign
law's conflict-of-law principles, which may in turn refer the court back to the law of the
forum"); 1 DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 20, at 70-72.
215. Rome Convention, supra note 7, art. 15. Article 15 (Exclusion of renvoi)
provides: "The application of the law of any country specified by this Convention means
the application of the rules of law in force in that country other than its rules of private
international law." Id.
216. See Horlacher, supra note 25, at 180.
217. See id. (noting that the court cannot apply United States conflict of laws rules
to determine what law governs the contract, regardless of the forum determined by the
United States rules).
218. See 2 DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 28, at 1204 (emphasis added).
219. 2 id.
G. Summation of the Rome Convention Provisions
In summary, the Rome Convention allows, in the absence of an
express choice of law, the application of: 1) laws that have the closest
connection to the transaction/contract, 0 or 2) laws that may not have the
closest connection to the transaction/contract, but that have some
apparent connection (e.g. the parties' place of business or residence). 2
When parties do express a choice of law in their contract, the Rome
Convention allows the application of: 1) laws that may have no
apparent connection to the transaction/contract, but that have an
underlying connection (such as financing or insurance),222 or 2) laws that
have no actual or apparent connection to the transaction/contract at all223
(as long as the laws are not contrary to either public policy 2 4 or the
mandatory rules of the country where all of the contract's connections
are).225
V. CONFLICT OF LAWS RULES FOR UNITED STATES CONTRACTS
COMPARED TO INTERNATIONAL ENGLISH CONTRACTS
In the United States, conflict of laws rules regarding contracts are
found in both the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
("Restatement") and the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."). 226 Both
sources of law are applicable to international and interstate cases 227 and
there are no great differences between the rules applied to international
cases and interstate cases.12' The Restatement section 10 provides that
"[tihe rules in the Restatement [of Conflict of Laws] ... apply to cases
with elements in one or more States of the United States and are
generally applicable to cases with elements in one or more foreign
nations., 229 The Reporter's Note to this section adds "American courts
220. See Rome Convention, supra note 7, art. 4(1); 2 DICEY & MORRIS, supra note
28, at 1214.
221. See Rome Convention, supra note 7, art. 4(2); 2 DICEY & MORRIS, supra note
28, at 1214.
222. See Rome Convention, supra note 7, arts. 3(1), 3(2); 2 DICEY & MORRIS, supra
note 28, at 1214.
223. See Rome Convention, supra note 7, arts. 3(1), 3(2); 2 DICEY & MORRIS,
supra note 28, at 1214.
224. See Rome Convention, supra note 7, art. 16.
225. See id. art. 3(3).
226. RESTATEMENT, supra note 140, §§ 10, 187, U.C.C. § 1-105 (1999).
227. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 140, § 10; U.C.C. § 1-105.
228. See John Prebble, Choice of Law to Determine the Validity and Effect of
Contracts: A Comparison of English and American Approaches to the Conflict of Laws
117 (1972) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University) (on file with University
Microfilms International).
229. RESTATEMENT, supra note 140, § 10. Comment c. to section 10 states that the
rules in the Restatement apply to both foreign and domestic cases because "similar
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and writers have not distinguished between international and interstate
conflicts for choice-of-law purposes. Indeed some of the leading choice-
of-law cases in [the United States] ... involved international conflicts,
and, so far as appears, this fact had no effect upon the ultimate
decision., 230  Likewise, the U.C.C. provides choice of law rules for
parties to multi-state or foreign transactions.23 ' Thus, an examination of
the specific choice of law provisions of the Restatement and the U.C.C.
provides a relevant comparison to the Rome Convention's choice of law
provisions.
A. The Restatement (Second) on the Conflict of Laws Regarding
Parties' Express Choice of Law232
Similar to the Rome Convention, the concept of party autonomy is
central to the Restatement's treatment of contractual relations.233 Unlike
the Rome Convention, the Restatement does not give contracting parties
unrestricted freedom to select the governing law. " For contracts where
parties have chosen the applicable law,235 the Restatement section 187(2)
provides:
values and considerations are involved in both interstate and international cases." Id.
cmt. c.
230. Id. Reporter's Note.
231. See U.C.C. § 1-105 cmt. 1(1999).
232. RESTATEMENT, supra note 140, § 187. Note that in the absence of an effective
choice of law by the parties, the Restatement resorts to the law of the state having the
most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties. See id. § 188. See ROGER
C. CRAMTON ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 103, 104 (5th ed. 1993). Because this provision
is similar to that of article 4 of the Rome Convention, and because the focus of this
Comment is on parties' express choice of law, no comparison will be made between the
Rome Convention and United States rules on implying law into a contract in the absence
of expressed choice. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 140, § 188; Rome Convention,
supra note 7, art. 4.
233. See CRAMTON, supra note 232, at 103.
234. See id. at 105. Note that the Restatement requires a substantial relationship
between the chosen law and the contract or between the chosen law and the parties. See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 140, § 187 cmt. f. This contrasts with the Rome Convention's
provisions that allow parties to choose a governing law that has no relationship
whatsoever to the contract or the parties. See infra Part IV.F.1 ("Party Autonomy
('Freedom of Choice')"); 2 DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 28, at 1213-14.
235. Comment a. to Restatement section 187 explains that section 187 applies when
the parties have expressly chosen a law to govern their contract and also when the parties
have not expressly chosen a law as long as the forum can conclude from the contract's
provisions that the parties did wish to have the law of a particular state applied. See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 140, § 187 cmt. a.
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The law of the state'236 chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights
and duties will be applied ... unless either (a) the chosen state has no
substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and there is no other
reasonable basis for the parties [sic] choice, or (b) application of the law of the
chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a
materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the
particular issue .... 237
1. Substantial Relationship and Reasonable Basis
The Comments to the Restatement provide guidance for situations
where the chosen law has a "substantial relationship" '238 to the contract or
the parties.! The substantial relationship requirement is satisfied when
the law chosen by the parties to govern the contract is the law of a state
where one of the parties is domiciled, has his principal place of business,
or the performance by one of the parties will take place."4
While the Comments to the Restatement indicate that parties may
have a reasonable basis for choosing the law of a state with which the
contract has no apparent relationship (e.g. choosing an unrelated but
familiar law when parties are contracting in foreign countries with
undeveloped or strange laws),24' some courts applying the Restatementdo nt neessailyfollw ths " 242
do not necessarily follow this guidance. Instead, these courts seem to
require a substantial relationship between the contract and the chosen
law.24' For example, in La Beach v. Beatrice Foods Co.,244 a New York
district court upheld the choice of law not because it was the law the
parties had stipulated in their contract, but because it was the law of the
jurisdiction that had the most significant contacts with the contract. 241 In
236. The term "state" in this context can be taken in its international sense and
refers not only to states of the United States, but also to sovereign nations and their
political subdivisions. See SIEGEL, supra note 40, at 9.
237. RESTATEMENT, supra note 140, § 187.
238. Id. § 187(2)(a).
239. See id. § 187 cmt. f. (indicating that when the chosen law has a substantial
relationship to the contract or the parties, the parties will be considered to have had a
reasonable basis for their choice of law).
240. See id.
241. See id. (indicating that when parties contract "in countries whose legal systems
are strange to them as well as relatively immature, the parties should be able to choose a
law on the ground that they know it well and that it is sufficiently developed").
242. See Edith Friedler, Party Autonomy Revisited: A Statutory Solution to a
Choice-of-Law Problem, 37 U. KAN. L. REV. 471, 490 (1989); infra text accompanying
notes 220-22.
243. See Friedler, supra note 242, at 490; infra text accompanying notes 244-49.
244. 461 F. Supp. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
245. See id. at 156. In this case, a discharged employee brought an action against
his former employer and a Nigerian attorney, alleging that the defendants wrongfully
coerced the plaintiff into giving up his controlling interest in a Nigerian company. The
relevant employment contract provided that it was to be governed by the laws of the
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Joy v. Heidrick & Struggles, Inc. , a New York civil court disregarded
the law expressly provided in the contract and, instead, applied the law
of the state with the most significant contacts . 7  In North American
Bank Ltd. v. Schulman,"' a New York county court invalidated the
parties' choice of law and applied the law that had the most substantial
relationship or governmental interest to the contract. 49
2. Chosen Law is Contrary to Public Policy
Section 187(2)(b) of the Restatement expresses strong regard for state
interests and state regulation by prohibiting the application of a chosen
law if such law goes against a fundamental policy of a state which has a
greater interest in the contract than the chosen state does.25° The
Comments to section 187 suggest that a fundamental policy is one that is
substantial and could be found in a statute which makes a contract illegal
or which is designed to protect a party from oppressive bargaining
power.2 1' A fundamental policy is not one that is likely to be found in
formal legal requirements (such as the statute of frauds) or the general
State of Illinois. The relevant contacts were spread out over three countries and three
states: the defendant was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in
Illinois, the plaintiff was a resident of New York, the contract was executed in London,
and the place of performance of the contract was Nigeria. The court determined that
Illinois was the governing law because it was the jurisdiction with the most significant
contacts. See id.
246. 93 Misc. 2d 818 (1977).
247. See id. at 822. This case involved an action brought by a New Jersey plaintiff
against an Illinois defendant to recover damages for the alleged breach of an
employment contract. The employment contract contained a clause that construed the
contract to be governed by Illinois law. The defendant had offices in Illinois and New
York with the defendant's office address in Illinois. The contract was executed in New
York, and the plaintiff's residence was New Jersey. The court held that New York had
the most significant contacts with the contract and, as such, New York law governed.
See id.
248. 123 Misc. 2d 516 (1984).
249. See id. at 521. The court in this case invalidated the parties' choice of Israeli
law and applied New York law even though the plaintiff's home address was Israel. The
court decided that New York bore the most significant relationship to the contract
presumably because the agreement was executed and processed in New York and the
defendant resided in New York. See id.
250. RESTATEMENT, supra note 140, § 187(2)(b) cmt. g. ("[C]hosen law should not
be applied without regard for the interests of the state which would be the state of the
applicable law with respect to the particular issue involved in the absence of an effective
choice by the parties.").
251. See id. Statutes involving insured individuals' rights are examples of
fundamental policy statutes. See id.
rules of contract law (such as the element of consideration).2 52
The Restatement's public policy exception is frequently used by
courts to invalidate the parties' choice of law and apply the law of the
forum. In Bush v. National School Studies, Inc., the Wisconsin
Supreme Court refused to uphold a choice of law clause in a dealership
contract because the clause was contrary to public policy.255 This
holding demonstrates that the concept of party autonomy will not be
upheld at the expense of public policy.5 6 Likewise, in Barnes Group,
Inc. v. C&C Products, Inc. ,57 where a contract stipulated that Ohio law
would govern and where covenants not to compete were enforceable in
Ohio but void in Alabama, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
it was error to apply Ohio law to an Alabama salesperson's contract
because to do so would be against Alabama's public policy.
258
In Southern International Sales Co. v. Potter and Brumfield Division
259
of AMF, Inc., the court invalidated a choice of law provision based on
both lack of a substantial relationship to the transaction and because it
violated public policy.2 6° The parties in that case chose Indiana law to
govern the contract, but a New York district court decided that Puerto
Rican law should be applied.26' The court reached that decision because
Puerto Rico not only had the most significant relationship to the
contract, but also because the application of Indiana law would have
frustrated the fundamental policy expressed in the Puerto Rican Dealers'
262Contracts Act.
252. See id.
253. See Friedler, supra note 242, at 491.
254. 407 N.W.2d 883 (Wis. 1987).
255. See id. at 886. The court held, for public policy reasons, that a dispute
regarding the termination of an agreement concerning sales in Wisconsin was governed
by Wisconsin law, even though the contract between the parties provided that Minnesota
law governed. See id. The court stated that while "the party autonomy principle...
promotes certainty and predictability in contractual relations .... it cannot be permitted
to do so at the expense of important public policies of a state whose law would be
applicable if the parties [sic] choice of law provision were disregarded." Id.
256. See id.
257. 716 F.2d 1023 (4th Cir. 1983).
258. See id. at 1032 (explaining that "[tlo honor the contractual choice of law would
make enforceable a contract flatly unenforceable in Alabama, surely impinging upon
'fundamental policy' of Alabama").
259. 410 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
260. See id. at 1341.
261. See id.
262. See id. (explaining that in deciding in favor of Puerto Rico on the substantial
relationship issue, the court considered the facts that most of the plaintiffs sales were in
Puerto Rico for use there and that the contract was signed in Puerto Rico).
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3. Comparison Between the Restatement Provisions and the
Rome Convention Provisions when Parties
Stipulate a Choice of Law
Based on the Restatement's requirements of a substantial relationship
and reasonable basis for the chosen law to be upheld, the main
difference between United States choice of laws263 and English choice of
laws26 is that United States law requires some connection between the
chosen law and the contract, but English law does not require such a
connection. 65  While this required connection may make sense, it
impinges on the freedom and autonomy of the parties. Judicial
interpretation may also be required before parties can be assured that
their connection is substantial or reasonable enough to be upheld. Even
when parties do have a reasonable basis for choosing a governing law,
courts sometimes disregard such choices in favor of applying a law that
has more substantial connections to the contract 26 Although such cases
where United States courts did not honor parties' choices of laws
constitute a minority, they raise the potential that parties' intentions will
not be upheld and add uncertainty to the contracting process. The retreat
from party autonomy under the Restatement seems to be much greater
than under the Rome Convention since under the Restatement, the
parties' choice can be defeated even if there is some connection with the
law of another state.267 Unlike the choice of law rules in the United
States, there is no overriding prohibition on arbitrariness applicable to
263. As provided by the RESTATEMENT, supra note 140, § 187.
264. As provided by the Rome Convention, supra note 7, art. 3.
265. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 140, § 187; Rome Convention, supra note 7,
art. 3. See also Patrick J. Borchers, The Internationalization of Contractual Conflicts
Law, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 421, 434 (1995) (explaining that while civil law
systems and recent international conventions do not require there to be a relationship
between the law chosen by the parties and the transaction, the United States tradition has
been to require some connection).
266. In LaBeach, 461 F. Supp. at 156, the court upheld the choice of law not
because it was the law the parties had stipulated in their contract, but because it was the
law of the jurisdiction which had the most significant contacts with the contract. In Joy,
93 Misc. 2d at 822, the court disregarded the law expressly provided in the contract and
instead applied the law of the state with the most significant contacts. In North
American Bank, 123 Misc. 2d at 521, the court invalidated the parties' choice of law and
applied the law that had the most substantial relationship or governmental interest to the
contract.
267. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FEDERAL, STATE, AND
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 277 (2d ed. 1998).
the choice of law rules in England.268 For example, if Southern
International Sales269 had been decided under the Rome Convention
instead of the Restatement, substituting foreign law for Indiana and
Puerto Rico law, the parties' choice of law stipulated in the contract
would likely have been upheld.270 Thus, parties' choice of law in the
United States appears to operate only as a contributing factor, rather than
as the single deciding feature, for courts to consider in determining the
contract's governing law. For these reasons, the choice of law rules
contained in the Rome Convention and applied by Contracting States'
courts provide parties with greater freedom, flexibility, and predictability
in contracting than choice of law rules contained in the Restatement and
applied by United States courts.
An additional feature relating to party autonomy and flexibility in
contracting that is expressly found in the Rome Convention, but not
271necessarily in the Restatement, is the concept of dipeqage, or the
application of different governing laws to severable parts of a contract.272
While this concept is not mentioned at all in the body of the
Restatement, 273it is referred to in the Comments to section 187.274 The
Comments to section 187 of the Restatement provide that the "extent to
which the parties may choose to have the local law of two or more states
govern matters ... is uncertain. 275 In contrast, the Rome Convention
provides that "[b]y their choice the parties can select the law applicable
to the whole or a part only of a contract."276 In doing so, the Rome
Convention allows parties greater freedoms and choices in their
contracts than the Restatement does.
The Rome Convention and the Restatement have comparable
268. See Prebble, supra note 228, at 110.
269. 410 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The cause of action in this case was for
the alleged wrongful termination of a contract which the parties had chosen to be
governed by Indiana law but which the court decided should be governed by Puerto
Rican law. The court applied Puerto Rican law because Puerto Rico not only had the
most significant relationship with the contract but also because the application of Indiana
law would frustrate the fundamental policy expressed in the Puerto Rican Dealers'
Contracts Act. See id.
270. See LOWENFELD, supra note 267, at 277.
271. See Rome Convention, supra note 7, art. 3(1); RESTATEMENT, supra note 140,§ 187 cmt. i. See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 448 (7th ed. 1999) (defining dpeqage
as a "court's application of different state laws to different issues in a legal dispute;
choice of law on an issue-by-issue basis").
272. See Horlacher, supra note 25, at 186.
273. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 140.
274. See id. § 187 cmt. i. The title of this comment is "Choice of two laws." Id.
275. Id. For example, it is uncertain whether parties can effectively decide that the
question of formalities of the contract shall be governed by the local law of one state and
the parties' capacity to make the contract shall be governed by the local law of another.
See id.
276. Rome Convention, supra note 7, art. 3(I).
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limitations on public policy and mandatory rules. Under both the Rome
Convention and the Restatement, the mandatory rules of a country/state
will most likely be considered to be part of the fundamental policy of
that country/state.277 Consequently, whenever the parties' choice of law
is unenforceable under article 3(3) of the Rome Convention because it
conflicts with the country's mandatory rules, it is also unenforceable as a
violation of fundamental policy under section 187(2)(b) of the
Restatement. 27 8 Thus, courts consider comparable policy concepts when
deciding cases under the Rome Convention and under the Restatement. 9
However, because United States courts tend to invalidate express
provisions for reasons of public policy under Restatement section 187,280
this fundamental policy exception of the Restatement may "become 'an
escape valve out of which all the predictability and certainty of the
autonomy rule [honoring contractual choices of law] flows"' 21 and may
"threaten to swallow the rule." 282
B. The Uniform Commercial Code and Express Choice of Law
The choice of law provisions most litigated in the United States are
those of the U.C.C.2 83 The U.C.C.'s approach to choice of law is similar
to, but a bit more liberal than,284 the Restatement. 285 Both the U.C.C. and
277. See Rome Convention, supra note 7, arts. 16, 3(3); RESTATEMENT, supra note
140, § 187(2)(b).
278. Rome Convention, supra note 7, art. 3(3); RESTATEMENT, supra note 140, §
187(2)(b). See also Rohm & Koch, supra note 76, at 12 (explaining that whenever the
parties' choice of law is unenforceable under the Rome Convention's articles 3(3) or
7(1), it is also unenforceable under the Restatement § 187(2)(b)). Note that the converse
is not necessarily true as English courts have enforced contracts which are against
foreign public policy. See supra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
279. Compare Ralli Bros. v. Compafhia Naviera Sota y Aznar, 2 K.B. 287 (C.A.
1920) and Kaufman v. Gerson, I K.B. 591 (C.A. 1904) with Bush v. Nat'l School
Studios, Inc., 407 N.W.2d 883 (Wis. 1987) and Barnes Group, Inc. v. C&C Products,
Inc. 716 F.2d 1023, 1032 (4th Cir. 1983). See supra notes 167-70, 175-77, 254-58 and
accompanying text.
280. See Friedler, supra note 242, at 491. See also supra text accompanying notes
243-49.
281. Barnes Group, 716 F.2d at 1039 (quoting Richard J. Bauerfeld, Effectiveness
of Choice-of-Law Clauses in Contract Conflicts of Law: Party Autonomy or Objective
Determination?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1659, 1673 (1982)).
282. Barnes Group, 716 F.2d at 1039.
283. See CRAMTON, supra note 232, at 91.
284. See infra text accompanying notes 285-99.
285. See U.C.C. § 1-105 (1999); RESTATEMENT, supra note 140, § 187. See also
Rohm & Koch, supra note 76, at 6 ("The Uniform Commercial Code ( U.C.C.) uses an
the Restatement uphold the concept of party autonomy, contingent on
certain limitations. 86 Section 1-105(1) of the U.C.C. provides: "when a
transaction bears a reasonable relation to [the chosen state] ... and also
to another state or nation the parties may agree that the law either of this
state or of such other state or nation shall govern their rights and
duties., 287 The Comment to section 1-105(1) of the U.C.C. indicates that
the parties' right to choose their own law is "limited to jurisdictions to
which the transaction bears a 'reasonable relation."'288 The "reasonable
relation" requirement is met in a "jurisdiction where a significant enough
portion of the making or performance of the contract is to occur or
occurs." 289  Thus, such a requirement would not be met in the
hypothetical case of transaction between United States and German
parties who wish to use the law of a country not represented in the
contract, such as England, instead of United States or German law.29°
A typical case where the choice of law provisions of the U.C.C. are
applied is Benedictine College, Inc. v. Century Office Products, Inc.29'
In that case, a Kansas district court upheld the law chosen in the
agreement.2 9 Although the state of the chosen law did not have the most
substantial relation to the transaction, it did have a reasonable relation to
the transaction such that the court decided not to override the parties'
choice of law.293  In another case, In Re Keene Corp.,9  the parties'
security agreements stated that Illinois law should govern, and because
approach comparable to the Restatement (Second).").
286. See Prebble, supra note 228, at 214.
287. U.C.C. § 1-105(1). Note that in the absence of an effective choice of law by
the parties, the U.C.C. "applies to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to" the
state. Id. Because this provision is similar to that of article 4 of the Rome Convention,
and because the focus of this Comment is on parties' express choice of law, no
comparison will be made between the Rome Convention and U.S. rules on implying law
into a contract in the absence of expressed choice.
288. Id. cmt. 1.
289. Id. The comment notes that the "reasonable relation" test is similar to the test
used by the court in Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403 (1927). In
Seeman, the Supreme Court upheld the law of the place of performance (Pennsylvania)
for a loan from a Pennsylvania lender to a New York borrower where the lender had its
place of business in Pennsylvania and had required repayment to be made in
Pennsylvania even though the agreement was entered into in New York. Seeman, 274
U.S. at 406-09.
290. See RALPH H. FOLSOM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN A
NUTSHELL 335 (5th ed. 1996).
291. 853 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Kan. 1994).
292. See id. at 1323. The court decided that there was a Missouri choice of law
provision in the agreement and where both Kansas and Missouri had relations to the
transaction in question, the court could not say that Missouri did not have at least
reasonable enough relations to the agreement to override the choice of law provision.
See id.
293. See id.
294. 188 B.R. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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the bank in question was an Illinois bank and Illinois bore a reasonable
relation to the transactions, a United States bankruptcy court held the
choice of law clause to be enforceable.9
Although the U.C.C. does not expressly limit choice of law provisions
when such choices are contrary to public policy, it is presumed that
courts will not enforce a provision that would violate a forum's
fundamental public policy.29  This presumption is reinforced in the
comments of section 2-302 of the U.C.C., where courts can refuse to
enforce clauses that are contrary to public policy or the dominant
purpose of the contract.297
1. Comparison Between the Uniform Commercial Code Provisions
and the Rome Convention Provisions when Parties
Stipulate a Choice of Law
Similar to the substantial relationship requirements of the
Restatement, 298 the U.C.C. requires that the parties' choice of law is
limited to jurisdictions with which the transaction bears a reasonable
relation.299 While the U.C.C.'s reasonable relation requirement seems
less stringent than the Restatement's substantial relationship
requirement, it still is much more restrictive on parties' freedom and
autonomy than the Rome Convention's provision which requires
absolutely no connection between the chosen law and the contract.3°° As
a by-product of the U.C.C.'s choice of law rules requiring a reasonable
relation, United States courts are forced to step in first to determine: 1) if
such a reasonable relation does exist, and then 2) if the applicable law
violates public policy. This process puts parties' choice of law at the
discretion of the court and reduces the certainty of the outcome.
Because courts applying the Rome Convention do not have to find a
connection between the chosen law and the contract but only have to
determine if the applicable law violates public policy or mandatory
rules, greater certainty in the outcome is achieved under the Rome
Convention. Again, the freedom, flexibility, and predictability provided
295. See id. at 889.
296. See Rohm & Koch, supra note 76, at 7.
297. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1999).
298. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 140, § 187(2).
299. See U.C.C. § 1-105(1).
300. See Rome Convention, supra note 7, art. 3(1); RESTATEMENT, supra note 140,
§ 187(2); U.C.C. § 1-105(1).
in the rules of the Rome Convention are more consistent with parties'
intentions than counterpart United States rules.
VI. CONCLUSION
In a great number of cases, parties fail to choose the law to govern
their contracts"' and choice of law problems result from contractual
incompleteness.02 It is the function of the law to complete the gaps in
these contracts; the law accomplishes this task by applying default
rules.3 3  As evident from the analysis of article 4 of the Rome
Convention," the default rules that are used to imply a governing law
into a contract that comes under the Rome Convention in the absence of
choice are confusing and unpredictable, even more confusing and
unpredictable than pre-Rome Convention English common law. The
application, non-application, and possible rebuttal of the characteristic
performance and closest connection tests tend to complicate matters so
much that even courts have trouble interpreting and applying them. In
addition, because parties have not chosen an applicable law, they are
forced to wait until the court determines such a law to know how the
contract provisions will be enforced. And because courts'
interpretations vary, there is little certainty in the terms which will
eventually govern the contract. Parties should be aware of these
considerations and should take steps to ensure the certainty of the
outcome of a litigated contract by including an express choice of law in
the contract.
Certainty is especially important in international contracts as certainty
protects the parties' expectations and increases the predictability of a
result, regardless of the locality of the forum.3 °5 The Rome Convention
affords parties this certainty by allowing them to choose the specific law
they wish to govern their contracts, regardless of whether it has any
connection to the transaction.3  This provides an opportunity for parties
to choose: (1) a neutral law that has no relation whatsoever to the
contract so that neither party has an advantage over the other, (2) a law
that is specialized for the particular field that their contract deals with,
301. See NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 1, at 487.
302. See Whincop & Keyes, supra note 80, at 526 (explaining that contractual
incompleteness results when parties do not write completely specified contracts).
303. See id.
304. Rome Convention, supra note 7, art. 4. See also Part IV.E. ("Default Rules
and Resulting Interpretations when an Express Choice of Law Clause is Not Included
(The Rome Convention, Article 4)").
305. See Rohm & Koch, supra note 76, at 3-4.
306. Rome Convention, supra note 7, art. 3. See also Part IV.F. ("Including a
Choice of Law Clause (The Rome Convention, Article 3)").
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(3) a law that would provide the most favorable tax implications to their
transaction, or (4) whatever law satisfies their particular interests. These
choices provide contracting parties with the greatest amount of party
autonomy available in contract law.
In comparison, the conflict of laws rules in the United States under the
Restatement and U.C.C. restrict contracting parties' autonomy by
dictating that the parties' choice of law will be upheld only if it is
significantly connected to the transaction. This leaves parties
contracting in the United States with less freedom, certainty, and
predictability in obtaining their desired results. As a result, United
States entities are less attractive trading partners than international
entities." 7
For these reasons, contracting parties should be aware of the
provisions of the Rome Convention and take advantage of their
flexibility. Parties can bring an international contract under the rules of
the Rome Convention by bringing their case before a Contracting State's
court."' Parties can express their choice of law to ensure their contracts
are carried out in accordance with their wishes. Doing so will provide
them with the greatest amount of predictability, certainty, and freedom
in contracting. It will also provide more uniform results which will
encourage more international contracting.
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307. See Borchers, supra note 265, at 438.
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